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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Divine Trinity, by David Brown. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985; pp. 
xvii + 315. $24.95. 
Reviewed by ELEONORE STUMP, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University. 
David Brown's The Divine Trinity is an important book which I hope will 
influence the direction of certain work in contemporary philosophy of religion. 
It is an attempt to stimulate a dialogue between philosophers of religion and 
biblical scholars, a dialogue I think is long overdue, in order to combine the 
studies of the historical basis for and philosophical credibility of Christian doc-
trines. The doctrine primarily at issue in his book is that of the Trinity, though 
he also discusses at some length the nature of the Holy Spirit and the doctrine 
of the Incarnation. 
The book is organized into three parts. The first part examines what Brown 
calls the wider context of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here he takes as his main 
opponents scholars whom he labels 'deists', those who accept the existence of 
God but deny that God intervenes in the world. Chapter 1 argues for the advantages 
of an interventionist view of God. Chapter 2 presents a theory of how such 
divine intervention might occur, arguing along the way for an understanding of 
Scripture as a fallible record of a progressive dialogue between God and human 
beings in which God's nature is increasingly revealed but often enough misun-
derstood and misreported by Scriptural authors. 
The second part of the book is also propaedeutic to its main argument. It 
attempts to show that there are grounds for Trinitarianism because there are 
reasons for belief in the Incarnation and in the existence of the Holy Spirit. 
Brown focuses on two models for the Incarnation, the traditional one (the "Chal-
cedonian" view) in which the incarnate Christ is one person who simultaneously 
has both a complete human and a complete divine nature, and a more recent 
view (the "Kenotic" model) according to which a divine person ceased to have 
a divine nature and acquired instead a human nature for a certain time, after 
which he resumed his divine nature. In the succeeding section Brown considers 
both Christian and non-Christian religious experience to show that there is an 
element of deity in such experiences which is not comprehended by the conception 
of God as either of the first two persons of the Trinity but which is captured by 
the concept of the Holy Spirit. 
Finally, in part 3, Brown argues on the basis of his previous discussion for 
the coherence of a certain theory of the Trinity. He rejects as incoherent the 
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traditional understanding of the doctrine as held by Augustine and Aquinas and 
allies himself instead with a view he associates with the Cappadocian Fathers. 
This view of the Trinity emphasizes the plurality of the divine persons and 
construes their unity as much broader and looser than numerical identity. It is 
a view which, as Brown recognizes, comes perilously close to tritheism; and a 
good part of his defense of the doctrine is an attempt to show that the Cappadocian 
model is compatible with monotheism. 
I found a good deal to disagree with in this rich book. For example, Brown's 
Kenotic model of the Incarnation does not seem to me coherent; it is not clear 
to me in what sense a divine person can be said to be the same as the human 
Jesus because (among other reasons) at the moment Jesus begins to exist 
(whenever that is) there is neither bodily continuity nor the continuity of character 
and memories between the divine person and the neonatal or fetal Jesus. The 
discussion of the traditional view of the Trinity also struck me as highly 
inadequate. Aquinas's theory of the Trinity, for instance, is dismissed as "total 
nonsense" (p. 291) after one paragraph of discussion and a one-sentence quotation 
from Aquinas. And I was not persuaded by Brown's attempts to defend the 
Cappadocian view of the Trinity from charges of incoherence or tritheism. 
But I also found a great deal to admire in the book. Brown's evaluation of 
contemporary theology pervades the book, and it tends to be insightful and 
incisive. His criticism in Chapter 3 of Schillebeeckx's approach to the Resurrec-
tion is a good case in point. The range of Brown's learning is also very impressive. 
He moves easily from discussions of the historical conditions surrounding the 
old Testament exile of the Jews to Wiggins's views on identity. He is familiar 
with the complexities of Patristic theology and scholastic philosophy and yet 
clearly is able to address contemporary theology in its own terms. And, most 
importantly for the overall purpose of his book, he comprehends the historical 
concerns of a biblical critic, but he is also familiar with the methods and the 
literature of current philosophy of religion. In consequence, his book is itself an 
example of the sort of dialogue between biblical exegetes and philosophers Brown 
is urging; and in my view the importance of his beginning such a dialogue far 
outweighs his book's flaws. 
The present lack of dialogue, Brown points out, gives rise to two problems. 
On the one hand, he complains, contemporary philosophers of religion tend to 
ignore "the meaning of the Biblical data" (p. 53) in formulating their arguments, 
failing to recognize that detailed acquaintance with biblical criticism is crucial 
for understanding the religion one is attacking or defending. And on the other 
hand, he maintains, biblical critics and contemporary theologians tend to consider 
only the historical origin of Christian doctrine and to assume that there is a 
simple identity between what is historically authentic and what is theologically 
acceptable. To this essentially correct analysis of the situation it seems to me 
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imperative to add what will strike any sensitive philosophical reader of Brown's 
book: biblical critics, including Brown, often enough base their conclusions 
about historical authenticity on arguments which cannot survive philosophical 
scrutiny; in fact, what passes for historical reasoning is often barely disguised 
philosophical or theological speculation based on certain unexamined religious 
(or irreligious) presuppositions. I want to consider in detail one such case of 
exegesis in Brown's book in order to show something about the way in which 
philosophers of religion can contribute to the historical accuracy of biblical 
criticism as it is currently practiced in secular universities. 
Consider, for example, Brown's discussion of the Magnificat. In the last part 
of Chapter 3 (p. 136) Brown makes this claim: "Earlier in the chapter I gave a 
reason why the Magnificat is unlikely to be historical; it reflects the victory of 
the Resurrection." If we tum to the relevant section earlier in the chapter, we 
find the following argument to support Brown's claim: 
"That the birth narratives [concerning Jesus] cannot be accepted as 
historical in toto as they stand would now be all but universally con-
ceded .... To mention but two of the problems, the sentiments of the 
Magnificat 'are not really the appropriate sentiments of a maiden who 
has not yet given birth to the Messiah; they are much more appropriate 
if composed by those who know that through the resurrection God has 
reversed the crucifixion' ... " (p. 124). 
In this passage Brown is quoting from the work of a New Testament scholar 
who has apparently given many reasons for thinking that the birth narratives are 
not historical. I have nothing to say here about those reasons or that scholar's 
work. But the reason Brown singles out as showing the lack of historicity in the 
birth narratives seems to me to tell us only something about Brown and nothing 
at all about their historicity. Because his language is imprecise, it is hard to be 
definite about his argument, and his conclusion in particular is presented sugges-
tively rather than stated explicitly; but taken in context, his reasoning is apparently 
something like the following. 
(I) The Magnificat reflects the victory of the Resurrection. 
(2) Sentiments reflecting the victory of the Resurrection are not senti-
ments appropriate to Mary in the period before the birth of the 
Messiah. 
(3) They are sentiments particularly appropriate to "those who know 
that through the resurrection God has reversed the crucifixion". 
(4) Therefore, the Magnificat was composed by "those who know that 
through the resurrection God has reversed the crucifixion" and not 
by Mary. 
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There are three problems with this argument. In the first place, the first premiss 
seems to me just false. The Magnificat contains no mention of or direct allusion 
to either victory or resurrection; in fact, as far as I can see, except for the clear 
references to the female gender of its author, the Magnificat could easily enough 
pass for one of the Psalms. The closest the Magnificat comes to reflecting the 
victory of the Resurrection (and it is not very close at all) is in the positive view 
of God as rejecting the rich and mighty while helping the poor and hungry and 
in general being an aid and comfort to his people. But such sentiments might 
have been (and were) uttered by Jews well before the Christian era. Consequently, 
the sentiments reflected in the Magnificat do not seem to me peculiarly appropriate 
to post-Easter Christians; and so premiss (3) even if true seems to me irrelevant 
to the argument's conclusion. 
Now if the first premiss of this argument is false, the argument is of course 
unsound regardless of the truth or falsity of the second premiss. Nonetheless it 
is worth reflecting on the second premiss for what it shows about the methodology 
of biblical criticism. The second premiss is vague; but if it is to support the 
conclusion in (4), then by "not.. . appropriate to Mary" it must mean something 
to the effect that (given human nature and the world we live in) Mary could not 
have uttered sentiments reflecting the victory of the Resurrection. Furthermore, 
"sentiments reflecting the victory of the Resurrection" is a vague phrase, the 
meaning of which is not clear. But suppose the strongest interpretation of it and 
the strongest textual basis supporting it; suppose that in fact there were a line 
in the Magnificat which said 'the crucifixion will eventuate in a victorious 
Resurrection', or words to that effect. Would (2) be true in that case? The answer 
to that question depends entirely on one's religious presuppositions. For atheists 
or even deists in Brown's sense of the word, the answer is 'yes,' because it is 
at best extremely improbable that an ordinary human mind would be able to 
foresee accurately detailed particular events and beliefs of the sort in question. 
But, of course, if there exists an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God 
who sometimes communicates his purposes to his creatures, then the answer is 
clearly 'no.' Sentiments reflecting the victory of the Resurrection are not appro-
priate to Mary in that period if she was left to herself; but God might not have 
left her to herself, and her utterance of such sentiments might reflect something 
given her by God. Hence, an acceptance of (2) presupposes a denial of the 
existence of a God of this sort. So Brown's assessment of the historicity of a 
Christian sacred text is based not on certain historical data but rather on an 
implicit denial of a central Christian tenet. There is consequently no reason why 
someone holding traditional Christian beliefs (or anyone else without a warranted 
belief that such a God does not exist) should take seriously this particular argument 
against the historicity of the birth narratives. And there is certainly no basis for 
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thinking of this argument as a historical argument or as a historical investigation 
of the biblical narrative, as Brown seems to do. This is simply a theological 
argument based largely on a philosophical presupposition which the author neither 
examines nor justifies. 
Finally, something needs to be said about the conclusion. It is not formulated 
in so many words in Brown's text, but it is strongly suggested in the context. 
If this is, as it seems to be, the conclusion Brown intends for this argument, 
then it should be noted that even if all the premisses were above reproach so 
that Brown could support his claim about the non-historicity of the birth narratives, 
the conclusion in (4) is not validly inferred. At best, what could be derived from 
these premisses is that the Magnificat was not composed by Mary in that period 
of her life. There is nothing in the premisses to rule out, for example, the 
possibility that Mary composed the Magnificat later in her life. 
Brown is one of the more judicious and sensible contemporary biblical scholars 
I have read, and certainly he has an extensive acquaintance with contemporary 
analytic philosophy. And yet biblical exegesis based on specious arguments of 
the sort just analyzed abound in his book. So, for example, he "is led to doubt 
whether Jesus ever turned water into wine" in part because "it flies in the face 
of the type of God revealed elsewhere, where miracles exhibit some deep pastoral 
concern" (p. 65). Here as in the preceding case we may question his interpretation 
of the text. Why should we suppose that Jesus had "no deep pastoral concern" 
in this case? The story in John, after all, concludes by saying that in this miracle 
Jesus manifested his glory and his disciples believed in him (In. 2.11); such a 
result, if foreknown and intended, does in fact seem to indicate pastoral concern. 
And, secondly, we may also question the validity of the implicit inference. Even 
if the miracle at Cana showed no pastoral concerns, why should we believe that 
all of Jesus' miracles have to be motivated by pastoral concern because most of 
them are? On anyone's account, Jesus was a person, not a simple programmed 
machine. Even if virtually all his miracles were motivated by pastoral care, why 
couldn't he have had an auxiliary motive which operated in a minority of cases, 
or why couldn't he have acted outside his usual pattern of action? Finally, here 
too there is an implicit presupposition concerning a religious belief. For if we 
approach the text with Christian beliefs rather than with atheistic or deistic 
presuppositions, if we take Jesus to be (somehow or other) divine, we will not 
automatically suppose that we as finite creatures can clearly know all his motives 
or can always discern from the narrative what motive was governing one of his 
historical actions. 
No doubt much of the current historical exegesis of the Bible is based on 
strong historical evidence, clear reasoning, and uncontentious assumptions. But 
much of it, in Brown's book and elsewhere, is marked by arguments which are 
invalid, textual interpretations which are at best dubious, and non-historical 
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philosophical presuppositions which are unexamined and unjustified. The best 
response philosophers can make to Brown's excellent and learned book is to 
take up his invitation to a dialogue with biblical critics. In that dialogue philos-
ophers will undoubtedly have a great deal to learn; but they also will have much 
to teach, and what they have to teach should make a significant difference to 
biblical scholarship. 
Understanding Identity Statements, by Thomas V. Morris. Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1984. Pp. xv and 152. $23.75, (paper $16.25). 
Reviewed by PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame. 
This book, theJifth in the series of Scots Philosophical Monographs, discusses 
the analysis of identity statements in its first five chapters and the epistemic 
assessment of identity statements in its last four chapters. Identity statements 
are statements which can be expressed in English by such sentences as the 
following: 
and 
(1) Phosphorus is Phosphorus 
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
(3) That pain is that neural event 
(4) Jesus of Nazareth is God the Son. 
What is it that identity statements state? Under what conditions are identity 
statements warrantedly assertable? The chapters devoted to the analysis of identity 
statements are intended to propose an answer to the first question, and those 
which concern the assessment of identity statements return an answer to the 
second. In this brief review, I shall give sketches of both answers, indicate why 
I find the first answer unsatisfactory, and discuss the application Morris makes 
of the second answer to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. 
Morris prepares the ground for his own analysis of identity statements by 
trying to undermine two of its prominent rivals; they are the objectual analysis 
and the metalinguistic analysis. According to the objectual analysis, identity 
statements state that a certain reflexive relation, self-identity, holds of a single 
object. Hence, on this analysis, (1) and (2) are standardly used to make the same 
identity statement. But this renders the proposed analysis very counterintuitive. 
Because it appears that (1) and (2) differ in informational content and epistemic 
status, it seems that they are used to make different identity statements. According 
to the metalinguistic analysis, identity statements state that two actually referring 
